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Blind quantum computation is a new secure quantum computing protocol where a client, who
does not have enough quantum technologies at her disposal, can delegate her quantum computation
to a server, who has a fully-fledged quantum computer, in such a way that the server cannot learn
anything about client’s input, output, and program. If the client interacts with only a single server,
the client has to have some minimum quantum power, such as the ability of emitting randomly-
rotated single-qubit states or the ability of measuring states. If the client interacts with two servers
who share Bell pairs but cannot communicate with each other, the client can be completely classical.
For such a double-server scheme, two servers have to share clean Bell pairs, and therefore the
entanglement distillation is necessary in a realistic noisy environment. In this paper, we show that
it is possible to perform entanglement distillation in the double-server scheme without degrading
the security of the blind quantum computing.
A first generation quantum computer will be imple-
mented in a “cloud” style, since only limited number of
groups, such as huge industries and governments, will be
able to possess it. When a client uses such a quantum
server via a remote access, it is crucial to protect client’s
privacy. Blind quantum computation [1–12] is a new se-
cure quantum computing protocol which can guarantee
the security of client’s privacy in such a cloud quantum
computing. Protocols of blind quantum computation en-
able a client (Alice), who does not have enough quantum
technologies at her disposal, to delegate her quantum
computation to a server (Bob), who has a fully-fledged
quantum computer, in such a way that Alice’s input, out-
put, and program are hidden to Bob [1–12].
The original protocol of blind quantum computation
was proposed by Broadbent, Fitzsimons, and Kashefi
(BFK) [1]. Their protocol uses the measurement-based
quantum computation on the cluster state (graph state)
by Raussendorf and Briegel [13]. A proof-of-principle ex-
periment of the BFK protocol has been also achieved re-
cently with a quantum optical system [3]. The BFK pro-
tocol has been recently generalized to other blind quan-
tum computing protocols which use the measurement-
based quantum computation on the Affleck-Kennedy-
Lieb-Tasaki (AKLT) state [5, 14, 15], the continuous-
variable measurement-based quantum computation [7,
16], and the ancilla-driven model [10, 17].
Since the original BFK protocol was proposed, new
protocols have been developed in order for blind quan-
tum computation to be more practical. One direction is
making blind protocols more fault-tolerant. While the
BFK protocol, which utilizes the brickwork state, would
be fault-tolerant, its threshold value is extremely small.
The recently proposed topological blind quantum com-
putation [6] employs a special three-dimensional cluster
state [18] and allows us to perform topologically pro-
tected blind quantum computation even with a high error
probability 0.43% (i.e., fidelity of 99.57%) in prepara-
tions, measurements, and gate operations.
Another direction is making Alice as classical as pos-
sible. In the above BFK-based protocols, Alice emits
randomly-rotated single-qubit states, such as single-
photon states. Recently, it was shown [4] that in stead of
single-photon states, coherent states are also sufficient.
Since coherent states are considered to be more classical
than single-photon states, this result suggests that Alice
can be more classical.
It is also possible to make Alice completely classical:
the double-sever blind protocol was introduced in Ref. [1],
where two Bobs share Bell pairs (but cannot perform
classical communication with each other) and perform
computational tasks ordered by Alice’s classical message.
The double-server blind protocol is also fault-tolerant,
but Bell pairs of fidelity above 99% are required even
if topological blind quantum computation is employed.
Since Bell pairs have to be sent from the third party or
Alice herself via public quantum channels, such an ability
to generate high-fidelity Bell pairs or encoding them into
quantum error correction codes would be too demanding.
In this paper we settle this problem. We show that
it is possible to perform entanglement distillation in the
double-server scheme without degrading the security of
blind quantum computing. As a result, the required fi-
delity of the Bell pairs is improved dramatically to 81%,
which is determined by the hashing bound and achieved
by quantum random coding [19, 20]. Since the Bell pair
generation of fidelity higher than 81% is nowadays easily
achievable by using, for example, parametric down con-
2version, the present result is crucial in blind quantum
computation to make Alice (or the third party) as classi-
cal as possible by using practically noisy Bell pair sources
and quantum channels.
Before proceeding to our main result, let us briefly
review the BFK blind protocol [1]. Assume that Al-
ice wants to perform the measurement-based quantum
computation on the m-qubit graph state corresponding
to the graph G. The quantum algorithm which Al-
ice wants to run is specified with the measurement ba-
sis {|0〉 ± eiφj |1〉} for jth qubit (j = 1, 2, ...,m), where
φj ∈ {
kπ
4 |k = 0, 1, ..., 7}. (Note that such X − Y plain
measurements are universal [13].) The BFK protocol
runs as follows (see also Fig. 1):
S1. Alice tells Bob the graph G [21].
S2. Alice sends Bob
⊗m
j=1 |θj〉, where |θj〉 ≡ |0〉+e
iθj |1〉
and θj is randomly chosen by Alice from {
kπ
4 |k =
0, 1, ..., 7}.
S3. Bob makes |G{θj}〉 ≡
(⊗
(i,j)∈E CZi,j
)⊗m
j=1 |θj〉,
where E is the set of edges of G and CZi,j is the
CZ gate between ith and jth qubits.
S4. Alice and Bob now perform the measurement-based
quantum computation on |G{θj}〉 with two-way
classical communications as follows: when Alice
wants Bob to measure jth qubit (j = 1, 2, ...,m)
of |G{θj}〉, she sends Bob δj ≡ θj+φ
′
j+rjpi, where
rj ∈ {0, 1} is a random binary chosen by Alice and
φ′j is the modified version of φj according to the
previous measurement results, which is the stan-
dard feed-forwarding of the one-way model [13].
Bob measures jth qubit in the basis {|0〉 ± eiδj |1〉}
and tells the measurement result to Alice.
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FIG. 1: The single-server blind protocol. (a) Alice sends
many single-qubit states to Bob. QD is a device which emits
randomly rotated single qubits. (b) Bob creates a resource
state. Alice and Bob perform the measurement-based quan-
tum computation through the two-way classical channel. CC
is a classical computer.
We call this protocol the single-server protocol, since
there is only a single server (Bob). It was shown [1]
that whatever Bob does he cannot learn anything about
Alice’s input, output, and algorithm.
In the above single-server protocol, Alice has to have
the ability of emitting randomly-rotated single-qubit
states, {|θj〉}
m
j=1. It was shown in Ref. [1] that if we
have two servers (Bob1 and Bob2) who share Bell pairs
but cannot communicate with each other, Alice can be
completely classical. (Alice has only to have a classical
computer and two classical channels, one is between Alice
and Bob1 and the other is between Alice and Bob2.) We
call such a scheme the double-server scheme, since there
are two servers. A protocol of the double-server scheme
runs as follows [1] (see also Fig. 2):
D1. A trusted center distributes Bell pairs to Bob1 and
Bob2 [22]. Now Bob1 and Bob2 share m Bell pairs,
(|00〉+ |11〉)⊗m.
D2. Alice sends Bob1 classical messages {θj}
m
j=1, where
θj is randomly chosen by Alice from {
kπ
4 |k =
0, 1, ..., 7}.
D3. Bob1 measures his qubit of the jth Bell pair in the
basis {|0〉±e−iθj |1〉} (j = 1, ...,m). Bob1 tells Alice
the measurement results {bj}
m
j=1 ∈ {0, 1}
m.
D4. After these Bob1’s measurements, what Bob2 has
is
⊗m
j=1 Z
bj
j |θj〉 =
⊗m
j=1 |θj + bjpi〉. Now Alice and
Bob2 can start the single-server BFK protocol with
the modification {θj}
m
j=1 → {θj + bjpi}
m
j=1.
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FIG. 2: The double-server blind protocol. (a) Bob1 and
Bob2 share Bell pairs. Alice sends classical messages to Bob1.
Bob1 performs measurements on his qubits of the Bell pairs,
and tells the measurement results to Alice. (b) Alice and
Bob2 run the single-server blind protocol through the two-
way classical channel. CC is a classical computer.
In addition to the advantage of the completely classical
Alice, the double-server scheme is intensively studied in
computer science in the context of the multi-prover in-
teractive proof system, which assumes computationally
unbounded and untrusted prover (server), and device-
independent quantum key distribution [1, 23, 24].
Note that the impossibility of the communication be-
tween two Bobs is crucial in the double-server protocol.
If Bob1 can send some message to Bob2, Bob1 can tell
Bob2 {θj + bjpi}
m
j=1, and then Bob2 can learn something
about {φj}
m
j=1, since Bob2 knows {θj+bjpi+φ
′
j+rjpi}
m
j=1.
3On the other hand, if Bob2 can tell Bob1 {θj+bjpi+φ
′
j+
rjpi}
m
j=1, Bob1 can learn something about {φj}
m
j=1, since
Bob1 knows {θj + bjpi}
m
j=1. In these cases, the security
of Alice’s privacy is no longer guaranteed.
In order to perform the correct double-server proto-
col, two Bobs must share clean Bell pairs. Sharing clean
Bell pairs is also crucial in many other quantum infor-
mation protocols such as the quantum teleportation [25],
the quantum key distribution [26, 27] and the distributed
quantum computation [28–32]. One standard way of
sharing clean Bell pairs in a noisy environment is the en-
tanglement distillation [19, 20, 33, 34]. In entanglement
distillation protocols, two people, say Bob1 and Bob2,
who want to share clean Bell pairs start with some dirty
n Bell pairs. Then they perform local operations with
some classical communications, and finally “distill” m
(m < n) clean Bell pairs [19, 20, 33, 34].
If we consider the application of the entanglement dis-
tillation to the double-server blind protocol, one huge ob-
stacle is that two Bobs are not allowed to communicate
with each other in the double-server scheme. Hence, mes-
sage exchanges between two Bobs, which are necessary
for the entanglement distillation, must be done through
the Alice’s mediation, i.e., Bob1 (Bob2) sends a mes-
sage to Alice, and Alice transfers it to Bob2 (Bob1). It
is not self-evident that the security of the double-server
blind protocol is guaranteed even if we plug an entan-
glement distillation protocol into the double-server blind
protocol [37]. For example, Bob1 might send a message
to Alice pretending that it is a “legal” message for the
entanglement distillation. Alice might naively forward
that message to Bob2 without noticing Bob1’s evil inten-
tion and believing that it is a harmless message. In this
case, Bob1 can indirectly send some message to Bob2,
and hence the security of the double-server protocol is
no longer guaranteed.
If the entire entanglement distillation is completed be-
fore starting the double-server protocol, and if Alice del-
egates her computation to Bobs only once, then the com-
munication between two Bobs during the entanglement
distillation is harmless, since when they are doing the en-
tanglement distillation, messages related to Alice’s com-
putation are not yet sent to Bobs. However, if Alice del-
egates more than twice, then two Bobs might exchange
information about the previous double-server computa-
tion during the entanglement distillation for the next
round of the computation as in the case of the “device-
independence” argument of the quantum key distribution
with devices having memory [35]. Furthermore, the en-
tanglement distillation might be done in parallel with the
double-server protocol in order to avoid a decoherence.
In these cases, we must be careful about the communi-
cation between two Bobs during the entanglement distil-
lation. In terms of the composable security, this means
that we are interested in the composable security of the
“distillation + blind computing” protocol [37].
Throughout this paper, we denote four Bell states by
|ψz,x〉 ≡ (I ⊗X
xZz)(|0〉 ⊗ |0〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |1〉), where (z, x) ∈
{0, 1}2 and X ≡ |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|.
Protocol.— Now let us show that the entanglement dis-
tillation by two Bobs is indeed possible without degrading
the security. As in the case of the original BFK double-
server protocol, a trusted center (or Alice) generates n
Bell states, |ψ00〉
⊗n, and distribute them to two Bobs;
one qubit of each |ψ00〉 is sent to Bob1 and the other to
Bob2. Due to the noise in the channel between the center
and Bobs, each Bell state decoheres, |ψ00〉 → ρ. Hence
two Bobs share n inpure pairs ρ⊗n, where ρ is a dirty Bell
state: one qubit of ρ is possessed by Bob1 and the other is
by Bob2. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
ρ is the Werner state, ρ = Fψ11+
1−F
3 (ψ00+ψ01 +ψ10),
where ψ ≡ |ψ〉〈ψ|. If it is not the Werner state, it can
be converted into the Werner state by using the twirling
operation (after applying I ⊗XZ) [20]. In order to per-
form the twirling operation, Alice has only to randomly
choose a SU(2) operator, and tell its classical description
to two Bobs. Therefore the twirling operation does not
affect the security.
Since ρ is Bell-diagonal, ρ⊗n is the mixture of tensor
products of Bell states:
ρ⊗n =
∑
(z1,x1,...,zn,xn)∈{0,1}2n
p(z1, x1, ..., zn, xn)
n⊗
j=1
ψzj ,xj .
Alice randomly chooses a 2n-bit string s1 and sends it to
two Bobs. This s1 is chosen completely randomly being
independent of other parameters (such as θj , φj , etc.).
Each Bob then performs certain local unitary operation
which is determined by s1. Each Bob next measures a
qubit of a single pair in the computational basis, and
tells the measurement result to Alice. (The detail of the
unitary operation, which is irrelevant here, is given in
Ref. [20]. Which pair is measured is also determined by
s1 [20]. In brief, these unitary operations and measure-
ments are performed for obtaining s1 · v (mod2) for the
hashing, where v ≡ (z1, x1, ..., zn, xn).) From these mea-
surement results by Bobs, Alice can gain a single bit s1 ·v
(mod2) of information.
Since a single pair is measured out, now two Bobs share
n−1 pairs. If Alice and two Bobs repeat a similar proce-
dure (i.e., Alice randomly chooses a 2(n−1)-bit string s2
and tells it to two Bobs. Two Bobs perform local oper-
ations, measure a single pair in the computational basis,
and tell the measurement results to Alice), Alice can gain
another single bit of information. In this way, they repeat
this procedure many times, and Alice obtains enough bits
to perform the hashing, which works as follows.
The probability distribution p(z1, x1, ..., zn, xn) has al-
most all its weight for a set of ∼ 2nS(ρ) “likely” strings,
where S(ρ) is the von Neumann entropy of ρ. The prob-
ability that a 2n-bit string (z1, x1, ..., zn, xn) falls out-
side of the set of the 2n(S(ρ)+ǫ) most probable strings
4is O(e−ǫ
2n) [20]. Therefore, Alice can (almost) specify
p(z1, x1, ..., zn, xn) if she gains nS(ρ) bits of information
about p(z1, x1, ..., zn, xn). This means that it is suffi-
cient for Alice and two Bobs to repeat the above proce-
dure for nS(ρ) times. Then, two Bobs spend nS(ρ) pairs
for measurements, and therefore at the end of the dis-
tillation they share m ≡ n− nS(ρ) pairs,
⊗m
j=1 |ψzj,xj 〉,
where (zj , xj) ∈ {0, 1}
2. Alice knows the 2m-bit string
(z1, x1, ..., zm, xm).
After the distillation, Alice and two Bobs can start the
double-server protocol. Now we modify the double-server
protocol as follows:
D1’. Two Bobs share
⊗m
j=1 |ψzj ,xj〉.
D2’. Alice sends Bob1 classical messages {θ′j ≡
(−1)xjθj + zjpi}
m
j=1, where θj is randomly chosen
by Alice from {kπ4 |k = 0, 1, ..., 7}.
D3’. Bob1 measures his qubit of the jth Bell pair in the
basis {|0〉±e−iθ
′
j |1〉} (j = 1, ...,m). Bob1 tells Alice
the measurement results {bj}
m
j=1 ∈ {0, 1}
m.
D4’. The same as D4.
Since D4’ is the same as D4, it is obvious that Alice can
run the correct single-server blind quantum computation
with Bob2.
Bob1 cannot send any message to Bob2.— Let us show
that Bob1 cannot send any message to Bob2. What
Bob2 receives from Alice are bit strings, s1, ..., sn−m, and
{θj + bjpi + φ
′
j + rjpi}
m
j=1. Since s1, ..., sn−m are com-
pletely uncorrelated with what Bob1 sends to Alice, Bob2
cannot gain any information about Bob1’s message from
s1, ..., sn−m. Furthermore, rj is randomly taken by Al-
ice from {0, 1} being independent of what Bob1 sends
to Alice. Therefore, Bob2 cannot gain any information
about bj from θj + bjpi+φ
′
j + rjpi. Bob1 and Bob2 share
entangled pairs. However, due to the no-signaling prin-
ciple, only sharing entangled pairs is useless for message
transmission. Hence Bob1 cannot send any message to
Bob2.
Bob2 cannot send any message to Bob1.— Next let us
show that Bob2 cannot send any message to Bob1. What
Bob1 receives from Alice are bit strings, s1, ..., sn−m,
and {θ′j ≡ (−1)
xjθj + zjpi}
m
j=1. Again, s1, ..., sn−m,
are useless for the message transmission from Bob2 to
Bob1. Furthermore, θj is randomly chosen by Alice
from {kπ4 |k = 0, 1, ..., 7} being independent of what Bob2
sends to Alice and (z1, x1, ..., zm, xm). Therefore, Bob1
cannot gain any information about Bob2’s message from
θ′j . Hence Bob2 cannot send any message to Bob1.
Two Bobs cannot learn Alice’s computational
information.— Finally, let us show the security of
Alice’s computational information. First, from Bob2’s
view point, the difference between our protocol (i.e., the
distillation plus the modified double-server protocol)
and the original BFK double-server protocol is only that
Bob2 receives bit strings, s1, ..., sn−m, from Alice. Since
these bit strings are completely uncorrelated with Alice’s
computational information, our protocol is as secure as
the original BFK double-server protocol against Bob2.
Second, from Bob1’s view point, the differences be-
tween our protocol and the original BFK double-server
protocol are
(i) Bob1 receives bit strings, s1, ..., sn−m, from Alice.
(ii) Bob1 receives θ′j ≡ (−1)
xjθj + zjpi instead of θj
from Alice (j = 1, 2, ...,m).
Again, we can safely ignore (i). Regarding (ii): since
θj is randomly taken from {
kπ
4 |k = 0, 1, ..., 7} being
independent of Alice’s computational information and
(z1, x1, ..., zm, xm), Bob1 cannot gain any information
about Alice’s computation from θ′j . Hence our protocol
is as secure as the original double-server BFK protocol
against Bob1.
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